Working Papers
Working Papers
This paper asks how domestic migration transforms electoral politics in rich democracies. I start by describing the political differences between movers and stayers: while movers are more invested in national politics, stayers are more invested in local politics. Because of these differences, a nationally-minded electorate emerges in in-migration areas, while the electorate in out-migration areas becomes more locally-minded. These compositional changes affect the extent to which local elections are nationalized, leading to the dominance of national politics in in-migration areas and of local politics in out-migration areas. This process draws the attention of political parties to in-migration areas, resulting in the systematic underrepresentation of out-migration areas. I support these arguments using household panel data as well as data on cross-county migration, voting in local and national elections, and political selection in contemporary Germany. The paper identifies domestic migration as a little-acknowledged yet key factor shaping democratic functioning and stability.
How do native voters respond to refugee inflows? While past scholarship largely emphasizes popular backlash, this paper studies welcoming responses. I focus specifically on the building of durable institutions, which have received only scant attention so far. Analyzing comprehensive data on refugee support organizations (RSOs) in Germany, I demonstrate that the creation of RSOs during the recent refugee crisis was associated with domestic in-migration. This effect is not driven by differential demand among refugees or the selection of movers into liberal communities. I argue instead that domestic migration contributes to geographic polarization by concentrating voters who, due to their sociopolitical characteristics and past experiences, are particularly likely to support refugees. Household panel data substantiates the idea that movers became more likely to volunteer during the refugee crisis. The paper contributes to our understanding of refugee integration and joins a nascent literature on domestic migration and geographic polarization in rich democracies.
While the removal of unauthorized immigrants was a central promise of President Trump’s 2024 campaign, public attitudes toward deportation remain underexplored. Which unauthorized immigrants do Americans believe should be deported? To examine this, we conducted a preregistered conjoint survey experiment using a sample matched to Census quotas. Respondents evaluated pairs of hypothetical unauthorized immigrants varying in key traits and chose which one should be prioritized for deportation. We find that both Democrats and Republicans agree that unauthorized immigrants with criminal records should be deported first. Other traits---like community contributions, time in the United States, and social ties---have smaller but still substantive effects. We adjudicate our finding of bipartisan consensus with the partisan divide in support for mass deportation by pointing to partisan differences in beliefs about unauthorized immigrants’ criminality. By shifting focus to public opinion on deportation, this study offers new insights into a key political debate.
What are the implications of US-China competition for Asian American identity and political behavior? Using several pre-registered survey experiments, we explore whether and how increasing the salience of anti-China rhetoric impacts Asian Americans' affinity with their ethnic, racial, and national identity, support for political candidates, and engagement in civic initiatives. We find some suggestive evidence that anti-China rhetoric leads non-Chinese Asian Americans to identify more as American and Chinese Americans to identify more with their ethnic group, arguably to signal assimilation in American society. Anti-China rhetoric does, however, have strong consequences for Asian Americans' political behavior. It causes Asian Americans to support co-ethnic rather than a panethnic political candidate and to support fundraisers that benefit their co-ethnic group rather than Asian Americans more generally. These results point to a backlash effect of anti-China rhetoric. Asian Americans seek to distance themselves from a panethnic group label when exposed to anti-China rhetoric.
Politicians routinely engage in anti-China rhetoric, identifying China as a competitor or even an "enemy" of the United States. How does such rhetoric influence candidate support among East and Southeast Asian American voters? We leverage an original experiment embedded in a survey of 2,200 East and Southeast Asian American voters to examine how support for hypothetical candidates varies with their stance on China. Our findings show that these voters, both of Chinese descent and not, are less likely to support candidates who use hostile rhetoric against China. Our data is consistent with the interpretation that that effect is rooted in concerns about discrimination, which routinely accompany anti-China rhetoric. These findings draw attention to the domestic repercussions of candidates’ expressed foreign policy positions and offer new evidence on the political behavior of Asian Americans -- the fastest-growing racial group in America today.
What explains political support following major political and social transformations? Existing research typically emphasizes the role of transformation "losers" - those who experienced economic hardship. This paper shifts the focus to the "winners" and asks whether highlighting the transformation gains can strengthen political support. Using a preregistered survey experiment among East and West Germans (N = 3,249), we test whether prompting individuals to reflect on life improvements affects democratic or populist attitudes. We find no evidence: although the treatment increases perceived economic improvement, it has no effect on political support. Cross-national survey data confirm this striking asymmetry: democratic support correlates with economic dissatisfaction but not perceived improvements. To explain our results, we demonstrate that respondents rarely link economic gains to the political system and speculate that this asymmetry may stem from negativity biases and positive regime expectations. These findings highlight the challenges of restoring democratic support once disillusionment has taken hold.